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Beyond Political Islam: Nigeria, the Boko
Haram Crisis and the Imperative of National 
Consensus
Simeon H.O. Alozieuwa
Institute for Peace and Conflict Resolution
Abuja, Nigeria
Abstract: The escalation of the Boko Haram crisis in Nigeria that peaked in 
2010 has led to the emergence of many theories to explain its causes. 
These theories focus on the socio-economic/ human needs, vengeance, the 
Islamic theocratic state, and political dimensions. Beside the socio-economic 
perspective, which harps on the pervasive poverty in the North, the theocratic 
state analysis seems compelling not only because it fits into the sect’s mission 
to Islamize Northern Nigeria and carve it out as a distinct political entity, 
but it also resonates with political Islam, the driving ideology behind such 
Jihadi groups as Al-Qaeda in the Maghreb (AQIM) and Al-Qaeda in the 
Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) with which the sect has been linked. While this 
paper identifies with the political causes perspective in offering more cogent 
explanation of the crisis, it goes beyond theory to underline empirical facts 
that have shaped the group’s violence. It argues that in its current dimension, 
the Boko Haram crisis is squarely an outburst of a sense of exclusion by 
some powerful political forces from the northern part of the country. To save the 
country from similar crises in the future, Nigerian leaders should devise clearly-
defined periodic power-sharing formulae that can enable its component parts 
to have a voice.
Key Words: Boko Haram, Political Islam, Global Islamic Crescent, Political 
Militia, National Consensus.
Introduction
This paper analyzes the nature of the current terrorism in Nigeria by situating it 
within the context of the country’s extant democratic milieu and political experience 
rather than lumping it together, in Ankie Hoogvelt’s terms, with the broader 
theme of the “current Islamist crescent.”1 It adopts the popular name Boko 
Haram to identity the terror group that has waged an unrelenting campaign 
of violence against Nigerians since 2009. Otherwise the official name of the 
group is Jamatu’atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda’wati wal-Jihad (People Committed to 
the Propagation of the Prophet’s Teaching and Jihad). This clarification removes 
1 Ankie Hoogvelt, Globalization and the Postcolonial World: the New Political Economy of
Development (Hampshire: Palgrave, 2001).
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certain ambiguities which have beclouded the sect and its activities and obviated a 
clearer understanding of the objective of the current violence. Such ambiguity 
invariably hindered to some extent the state’s ability to properly diagnose the 
problem at the initial stage and respond appropriately. That failure on the part of 
the state enabled the group to metamorphose into the lethal monster it has now 
become.
Boko in Hausa language means book (education). Haram on the other hand 
means sin. Since the education common to the people of Nigeria is the western 
model, boko has come to generally mean, western education. Boko Haram therefore 
means western education is a sin. This name was given to the Jamatu’atu Ahlis 
Sunna Lidda’wati wal-Jihad by the Nigerian media because of the general 
assumption that the group’s philosophy seems to resist western education. The 
group has however contested the misrepresentation. According to one of the sect’s 
members, Mallam Sanni Umaru,
Boko Haram actually means “Western Civilization” is forbidden.
The difference is that while the first (Boko) gives the impression
that we are opposed to formal education coming from the West…
which is not true, the second affirms our belief in the supremacy
of Islamic culture (not education), for culture is broader. It
includes education but not determined by Western Education.2
Mallam Umaru’s exposition on the group has no doubt inspired the attempt 
to explain the group’s emergence and philosophy within the clash of civilization 
theoretical framework. Advanced by Samuel Huntington, the theory argues that in 
the post-Cold War era, people’s cultural and religious identities will constitute the 
primary source of conflicts in many countries of the world.3 Based on that theory, 
Ezeani E. Onyebuchi and Chilaka F. Chigozie argue that the violent extremism 
going on in Nigeria amidst the transformation of the country’s politics could be 
understood as a clash of civilizations.4 Hence the driving force of Boko Haram is 
religion, with Islam violently questioning Western values. This foundation resonates 
with the global political Islam from which Islamist groups generally draw their 
inspiration.
This paper goes beyond the general theory of Boko Haram’s religious origin. 
2 Cited in Ezeani Emmanuel Onyebuchi and Chilaka Francis Chigozie, “Islamic Fundamentalism and 
Problem of Insecurity in Nigeria,” in Internal Security Management in Nigeria: A Study in Terrorism 
and Counter-Terrorism, eds. Ozoemenam Mbachu and Usman Bature (Kaduna: Medusa Academic 
Publishers Limited, 2013), 204.
3 Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilization and the Remarking of the World Order (New York: 
Simon & Schuter, 1996).
4 Onyebuchi and Chigozie, 205.
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While it acknowledges its religious posturing, the paper critically interrogates 
the sect’s assumed religious background and contextualizes it within the general 
political milieu in the North-Eastern part of Nigeria from where its violence 
began and spread. In doing this, the paper attempts to draw attention to how 
this phenomenon actually first arose and how it has grown to acquire the life it has 
today. The paper emphasizes the sect’s violence, which has constituted a major 
security challenge confronting contemporary Nigerian society. In this regard, it 
considers the critical junctures, first, when the sect originally known in its 
immediate environment as non-violent in its propagation of its Islamic messages 
began to acquire arms; and second, the intersection at which it jettisoned its non-
violent posturing, even prior to the death of its leader, Mohammed Yusuf, before 
finally turning its rage against the larger Nigerian society.
Boko Haram’s Early History
According to Nnaemeka C. Okereke, initially, the Boko Haram sect had no 
specific name as its members attracted several descriptions where they operated 
based on the perception of the local population.5 Therefore, either as Yusufuya 
sect, Nigerian Taliban, Jamaatul Takfur Wal Hyra Ahlus Sunna, Khawaarji, Shabaab 
Muslim Youth Movement, Boko Haram, or Jamaatu Alhlissunnah Lidda’awatiwal 
Jihad, a name of which the sect approves, the exact date which the sect manifested 
on the Nigerian landscape remains largely a subject of speculation. While some 
tendencies trace the origin to 1995, others argue that the group was founded 
around 2001 or 2002. Similarly, the founder of the group is also contested. It 
is either ascribed to one Lawan Abubakar, who left for further studies at the 
University of Medina in Saudi Arabia, or to an evangelical group formed by 
Muslim students at the University of Maiduguri, Borno state, who reportedly felt 
dissatisfied with Western values.6
Relevant to this analysis, however, is that Mustapha Modu Jon, known as 
Ustaz Mohammed Yusuf, was the leader of the group in 2009 when the Boko 
Haram stand-off with security forces gained wider national attention. Under Yusuf, 
the sect was said to have recruited its membership of mostly women and children, 
school drop-outs and unemployed university and polytechnic graduates most of 
who tore up their certificates.7 Like the origin, the sect’s propensity for violence 
5 Nnaemeka C. Okereke, “Implementing the Nigerian Defence Policy: Reflections on the Boko 
Haram Crisis,” in Nigerian Defence and Security: Policies and Strategies, eds. Ozoemenam Mbachu 
and Ahmed A. Sokoto (Kaduna: Medusa Academic Publishers Ltd, 2011).
6 Simeon H.O. Alozieuwa, “Contending Theories on Nigeria’s Security Challenges in the Era of Boko 
Haram Insurgency,” The Peace and Conflict Review 7, no.1 (2012), accessed December 26, 2013, 
http://review. upeace.org/.
7 Okereke, 450.
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has also been a subject of controversy. Certain accounts cast Yusuf as someone 
whose preaching tilted towards violence. This was premised on the fact that 
he derived his inspiration from the works of a fourteenth century legal scholar, 
Ibn Taymiyya, who preached Islamic fundamentalism, and was also considered a 
“major theorist” for radical groups in the Middle East.8
There was also an account that Yusuf, a native of Girgir in the Jalasko local 
government area of Yobe state, received Quranic education in the Chad and 
Niger Republics and was imbued with radical instincts, which generated friction 
between him and other moderate Islamic scholars such as the late Jafa Adam, 
Sheik Abba Aji, and Yahaya Jingir.9 Remarkably, Yusuf was the son of Mallam 
Yusuf, a clerk at the Maiduguri office of the Kaduna State Transport Authority, 
who later abandoned his secular job to found an Islamiyya school where he taught 
the recitation of the Qur’an to Almajiris (street children). Yusuf Jr., a secondary 
school drop-out soon joined his father in his Quranic School, where his 
profound oratorical skills were honed. According to Simon M. Reef, it was here 
that Yusuf Jr. developed the effortless ability to convince people about the sincerity 
of his cause; his charisma also began to manifest.10 He became so popular, grew in 
influence, and effortlessly succeeded his father. Going by this version of Yusuf’s 
background, that projects him as one imbued with radical instincts, and which 
forced his relocation from Borno, where he grew up to Yobe his home state, he 
could be perceived as one with trouble-making potentials. Indeed, although he was 
said to have initially gone about his preaching peacefully, his views nonetheless 
drew attention from other Islamic preachers who saw both his preaching and 
interpretation of the Quran as a recipe for violence and an affront to authority.11
On the other hand, despite the inspiration Yusuf drew from Ibn Taymiyya, 
other accounts had him as someone who was opposed to any form of violence 
and who insisted that it was against the teaching of Islam. He resisted some 
of his followers’ relentless beliefs that “an Islamic state was realizable through 
preaching and mobilization of the people to reject secularism, by way of taking up 
arms and fighting to conquer the unbelievers.”12 Such a personality trait contrasts 
significantly with that of Yusuf’s successor, Abubakar Shekau, the Kanuri 
psychopath who “enjoys of killing anyone that God commands me to kill, the way 
8 Mohammed Aly Sergie and Toni Johnson, “Boko Haram,” accessed December 26, 2013 www.cfr.
org/nigeria/boko- haram/p25739.
9 Freedom C. Onuoha, “Countering the Financing of Boko Haram Extremism in Nigeria,” African 
Journal for the Prevention and Combating of Extremism 2, no. 1 (December 2011), 94
10 Simon M. Reef, “Foi’s Neighbours Open Up on Sheriff,” People’s Daily, August 10-16, 2009, 6.
11 Okereke, 457.
12 T. Suleiman, “The Plot to Islamize Nigeria,” Tell, November 30, 2009, 12.
Alozieuwa | 53
Journal of Retracing Africa, Volume 2, Issue 1, Fall 2015
http://encompass.eku.edu/jora/
I enjoy killing chicken and rams.”13 The emphasis on the personality difference 
between Yusuf and Shekau becomes useful for the purpose of ascertaining, as I 
have noted elsewhere, whether the sect’s current level of radicalization is a function 
of the deaths of its initial leadership and subsequent clampdown by the state, or 
due to the accession of its leadership of Shekau.14 It is noteworthy that before the 
death of Yusuf, the sect had already acquired arms and had also violently protested 
the killing of seventeen of its members who were on a funeral procession.
Boko Haram, Political Islam and Militant Islamic Violence
The concept of “political Islam” has generally been adopted by many scholars 
to identify the seemingly unprecedented irruption of Islamic religion into the 
secular domain of politics - an illegitimate extension of the Islamic tradition outside 
of the properly religious domain it has historically occupied.15 Hence, for Ibrahim 
Muazzam, in its contemporary forceful form, political Islam “is a modern 
ideological construction and not the product of a historical continuity with an 
essentialist Islam preserved in the hearts and minds of people. It is the result of a 
protracted societal crisis of multi-dimensional proportions revealing an ongoing 
dialectic between Muslims and their socio-economic political environment.”16
The rise of Islamist movements, Muazzam further notes, is thus, a result 
and a symptom of a society in crisis - the outcome of a process of development 
that has taken place in these countries, which includes rapid urbanization and 
social mobilization that has exceeded the capacity of the system. He also perceives 
that the activism of some of the Muslim groups as a function of the social, economic, 
and political context found in the various societies.17 Hoogvelt blames the crisis 
on colonialism and globalization, and argues that the contemporary Islamic revolt 
is the consequence of millions of people who do not have any prospect of being 
incorporated into the new global system. As she notes, “It is the failure of the 
national evelopment strategies in the neocolonial period, coupled with the 
recent episode of globalization that drives the contemporary Islamic crescent.”18 
Hoogvelt further makes the point that Islamic resurgence is best understood 
as a politics of identity in response to exclusion. In an attempt to remove the 
13 “Nigeria’s Boko Haram leader Abubakar Shekau in profile,” May 9, 2014, accessed November 16, 
2015, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-18020349.
14 Alozieuwa, “Contending Theories.”
15 Charles Hirschkind, “What is Political Islam,” Middle East Research and Information Project, 
accessed December 23, 2013, http://merip.org/mer/mer205/what-political-islam.
16 Ibrahim Muazzam, “Security Challenges in North Africa and the Maghreb,” African Strategic 
Review 2, no. 2 (April/May, 2011):39.
17 Ibid.
18 Hoogvelt, 199.
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pejorative edge from “political Islam,” however, Charles Hirschkind argues that 
despite the militant violence that has given practical meaning to the concept, it 
is not all forms of contemporary Islamic activism that revolve around trying to 
“capture the state.”19 He contends forcefully that
The vast majority of these movements involve preaching and 
other da‘wa (missionary) activities, alms giving, providing medical 
care, mosque building, publishing and generally promoting what is 
considered in the society to be public virtue through community action.20
The early history of the Boko Haram in Nigeria casts the group both in 
Hirschkind’s idea of the political Islamic groups which try to promote public virtue 
through community action and Hoogvelt’s Islamists who have raised the spectra 
of the jihad.21 For instance, Yusuf’s refusal to yield to the pressure by some of his 
followers to take up arms as a way of realizing an Islamic state aligns the Boko 
Haram sect with Hirschkind’s characterization. Similarly, Sanusi Mohammed, a 
journalist who had studied and had interacted with some leaders of the sect prior 
to the outset of the crisis, insists the sect was “not founded as terrorist group as 
erroneously believed in some quarters.”22 Even after Yusuf’s death, given its anti-
government posturing, it would have been uncharacteristic of the group to agree to 
mediation by former President Olusegun Obasanjo, who was seen as an unofficial 
envoy of the government. That meeting held on September 15, 2011 and aimed at 
opening a channel of dialogue between the government and the terror group, and 
had in attendance Yusuf’s father in-law, Babakura Fugu, a known gun dealer who 
made his property at the Railway Quarters in Maiduguri available to his son in-law 
for his religious activities.23
Certain tendencies about the sect, however, project it as a jihadist group. 
At its earliest periods, Yusuf leveled charges of corruption and failure to preach 
pure Islam on the sheiks that appointed him leader after Lawan Abubakar’s 
departure.24 Under Abubakar Shakau, the sect later declared its intention to 
Islamize Nigeria and truncate the country’s democracy. One of the earliest names 
19 Hirschkind.
20 Ibid.
21 Hoogvelt, 198.
22 “Boko Haram out to end 1914 amalgamation, install Islamic govt —Sanusi” Saturday Sun, January 
21, 2012, accessed November 17, 2015, http://www.gbooza.com/group/nigeriapolitics/forum/topics/
boko- haram-out-to-end-1914-amalgamation-install-islamic-govt-sanu.
23 Andrew Walker, “What is Boko Haram?” Special Report (USIP ), accessed 17 November, 2015, 
http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/SR308.pdf.
24 Emma Ujah, et al “Yar’Adua orders probe of Boko Haram leaders’ killing,” Vanguard, August 4, 
2009, accessed November 17, 2015, http://www.vanguardngr.com/2009/08/yaradua-orders-probe-
of- boko-haram-leaders-killing/.
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of the sect was the Taliban; the leadership of the group also trained in Afghanistan 
and Pakistan, which are well-known as the Taliban’s abode; and after the attack on 
a police station in Kanamma, Yobe state, the sect briefly flew the Taliban black 
flag as a gesture symbolizing commonality of cause.25 Some members claim to 
have trained in Afghanistan. Very germane here is that the Soviet resistance, 
from which the Boko Haram sect in Nigeria seemed to draw its inspiration, occurred 
against the backdrop of the Soviet replacement of the traditional Islamic practices 
and social conventions in Afghanistan. The call for a jihad in Afghanistan and its 
day-to-day implementation were not initiated by Muslim states as such, but by 
transnational Islamic religious networks. Thus, to the Boko Haram sect, which is 
part of this network, a “defensive jihad,” according to the Sharia, obliged every 
individual Muslim to participate.26
The sect leader, “Yusuf …embraced technology, [and] believed Western 
education should be ‘mediated through Islamic scholarship’, such as rejecting 
the theory of evolution and Western-style banking. He preached a doctrine of 
withdrawal.”27 And in spite of the unheeded complaints of a group of fifty 
Maiduguri-based Islamic clerics, who claimed to have warned and complained 
to “the government and security agencies about the activities of Yusuf,” not until 
the murder of Yusuf, his father in-law, Fungu, alleged, financier Foi, and members 
of the sect at a funeral procession in Maiduguri, did the Boko Haram violence scale 
up in the North-East.28
Noteworthy is that the government had made available the sum of a N100 
million blood money to the sect for the loss of some of its leadership. While the 
acceptance of the blood money from the government by the sect does not 
conform to a true jihadist movement, Boko Haram’s current level of radicalization 
could well be a function of the ascension of Shekau. Indeed not until late August, 
2011, after it had expanded the scope of its violence outside of the North-East, 
vis-à-vis the bombing of the United Nations House in Abuja, were there any 
credible links between the sect and some al-Qaeda regional affiliate groups such as 
al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and Somali’s al- Shabaab.29 Furthermore, 
the fractioning of the sect into two groups, with one focusing on local grievances, 
namely, the ascendency of a Muslim to Nigeria’s presidency, and the other seeking 
25 Joseph Lengmang, “The Rise of Religious Fundamentalism: A Critical Reflection in the Light of 
the ‘Boko Haram’ Phenomenon in Northern Nigeria,” in Religion and Post Conflict Peacebuilding in 
Northern Nigeria, ed. Shedrach G. Best (Ibadan: John Archers Publishers Ltd, 2011), 98.
26 Cited in R. Shackleford, “Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan and the Rise of the Taliban,” accessed 
November 17, 2015, http://voices.yahoo.com/soviet-invasion-afghanistan-rise-the-367600.html.
27 Sergie and Johnson.
28 Okereke 455.
29 Sergie and Johnson.
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alliance with external jihadi groups dedicated to imposing Islamist rule across 
the world, raises doubt about the group’s genuine commitment to the global 
Islamist agenda from the outset. Despite reference to the establishment of an 
Islamic government, the revelation that the Boko Haram was out to end the 1914 
amalgamation that brought together the Northern and Southern Protectorates to 
form the country called Nigeria30 fits into the political feud theory that the Boko 
Haram violence revolves around Northern angst against President Jonathan for 
ignoring an informal power-rotation agreement that should have kept a Muslim 
Northerner as president this time around.31
The Political Origin of Boko Haram Violence
A common notion about the Boko Haram sect is that it is a fundamentalist jihadist 
movement bent on imposing the Sharia law on Nigeria. This perception is fostered 
both by its perceived philosophical and perverse spiritual underpinnings, namely, 
total abhorrence for Westernization and secularization. According to Joseph 
Lengmang, this foundation drives the group’s activities, including its violence.32 
The abhorrence of westernization and secularity is also perceived to have been 
boosted by the reintroduction of Sharia in 1999 by the then governor of Zamfara 
state, Ahmed Yerima Although the re-introduction of the Sharia in Zamfara turned 
the abhorrenc of westernization and secularity ideology into a grassroots movement 
in the North, despite the subsequent adoption of the Sharia by 12 northern states 
widespread “disillusionment” accompanied the manner in which the Sharia was 
implemented. That faulty implementation provided profound dissatisfaction, 
which the Boko Haram sect tapped into to promote the idea that an Islamic state 
would eliminate the inconsistencies.33
But while the sect’s emergence has generally also been attribute to the 
ideology of hatred for westernization and secularity, the Boko Haram phenomenon 
actually arose from a prevalent culture of political thuggery in Nigeria. By 
this culture, political gladiators establish political militias which they use in the 
fierce struggle for the capture and control of political power. These militia groups 
exist across the regions and states of the country where they assume different 
forms and perpetuate criminal political activities on behalf of their benefactors. 
In the North, Borno and Yobe states had the Ecomog, Bauchi, Sara-Suka, 
Gombe, Yan- Kallare, Taraba state, Banu-Isra’il, Adamawa, Yan-Shinko, Kano, 
30 “Boko Haram out to end 1914 amalgamation, install Islamic govt —Sanusi” Saturday Sun, January 
21, 2012, accessed November 17, 2015, http://www.gbooza.com/group/nigeriapolitics/forum/topics/
boko- haram-out-to-end-1914-amalgamation-install-islamic-govt-sanu.
31 Sergie and Johnson.
32 Lengmang, 88.
33 Sergie and Johnson.
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Yan Gumurzu or Yan daba. In the South, the defunct “Bakasi Boys” operated in the 
East and were particularly notorious during the administration of former governor 
Chinwoke Mbadinuju in Anambra state.
There is also the Odua Youth Movement in the South-West, and the “Niger-
Delta Defense Force” in the Niger-Delta/South-South region. They are usually 
drawn from jobless university graduates and street wanderers, criminals, common 
thugs and in the North as abandoned Almajiri’s (street children). In most of the old 
Eastern part of the country, most of the youths who constitute the army of militants 
and kidnappers graduated from being political militia gangs who were recruited 
for criminal political activities during elections and dumped by their benefactors 
afterwards.
The culture of nurturing political militia gangs is however not a new 
phenomenon in Nigeria. It dates back to the pre-independence era. From the 
1950s, instances of political violence including the formation of political militias 
in the course of the contest for political power had become increasingly evident.34 
In the North, there were the Jammiyar Maukhatar, and the Positive Action as the 
armed political gangs of the Northern People’s Congress (NPC), and Northern 
Elements Progressive Union (NEPU), political parties respectively. In the East 
the National Convention of Nigerian Citizens (NCNC) had the Zikist Movement, 
whereas the Action Group (AG) political party had the Awoists.35
However, an important distinction needs to be made among these political 
militia groups both in terms of the eras and political geographies in which they 
operated and in some instances still subsist. In the pre- independence era, 
whereas both in the North and South, political militias were unknown to have 
emerged from any religious origin, those currently in the North do. Currently 
also whereas in the South those which drift into sundry criminal activities like 
kidnapping and armed robbery do not link their cause to any known religious 
ideology, their counterparts in the North do.
Although the Boko Haram insurgents currently espouses religious 
ideological orientation, most of its foundation membership were essentially made 
up of elements drawn from the army of political militias in some parts of the 
North. The point of departure however is that hitherto, political militant gangs were 
raised by political parties rather than individual politicians. The Boko Haram, as a 
violent group specifically started off as Ecomog, a band of political thugs linked 
34 A.O. Banwo, “Political Violence and Democratization in Nigeria: An Overview,” in Electoral 
Violence in Nigeria: Issues and Perspectives, ed. B. A. Olasupo (Lagos: Frankad Publishers, 2003), 
111.
35 See Simeon H.O. Alozieuwa, “Nigeria’s Social Groups, Power Struggle and the Political Economy 
of Violence” Igbo Studies Review 3 no. 3 (May 2014): 196.
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to the former governor of Bornu State, Ali Modu Sheriff, and some other politicians 
in the state in the struggle for the control of Government House in Maiduguri, 
aimed specifically at dislodging the then incumbent governor of the state, Mala 
Kachallah. The conditions that bred the army of recruits for both the politicians 
and the Boko Haram sect also clearly predate both Yusuf and Boko Haram. These 
conditions include general adverse socio-economic conditions, which equally bred 
an army of disillusioned citizenry and youths who questioned the existing socio-
economic and political system in Nigeria, and the Sharia fervor in the North, which 
favors the imposition of the Islamic legal system as an alternative to the Western 
system.
In Borno state, the former governor, Ali Modu Sheriff, was said to be 
instrumental to the prominence of the sect. It was alleged that he was one of 
their financiers and supporters until the alliance broke down.36 Despite Sheriff’s 
persistent denial of any link with Boko Haram, Ali Konduga, an arrested member 
of the sect, confessed to the agents of the Nigerian State during interrogation 
that a certain politician from Borno State stepped in to sponsor Ecomog when the 
relationship went sour with Ali Modu Sheriff.37 Then acting Minister of Defense, 
Labaran Maku, was therefore right when he blames politicians from the North 
East for the “insecurity [which] is not religious but the after-effect of violent local 
politics.”38 Thus, the killing of government functionaries in Borno and Bauchi 
States in the early stages of violence clearly links “the rise of Boko Haram in 
Maiduguri and Bauchi … to politics.”39 Sheriff also views the Boko Haram 
violence as political and not religious.40
Ustaz Buji Foi, the alleged financier of Yusuf, deserves further mention at this 
juncture. Foi’s days as chairman of Kaga Local Government Council under the 
Kachallah administration was ‘“unprecedented in the history of the area council”’ 
in terms of “transforming Benisheikh, the headquarters of the (Kaga) council 
into a paradise of administrative transparency.” He was “noted for his sense of 
36 Boko Haram out to end 1914 amalgamation, install Islamic govt —Sanusi” Saturday Sun, January 
21, 2012, accessed November 17, 2015, http://www.gbooza.com/group/nigeriapolitics/forum/topics/
boko-haram-out-to-end-1914-amalgamation-install-islamic-govt-sanu.
37 “Suspected Boko Haram Suspect Fingers Ex-Gov Sheriff, Senator Ndume, Ex-Envoy As Sect 
Sponsors,” accessed November 17, 2015, http://ireports-ng.com/2011/11/21/suspected-boko-haram-
suspect-fingers-ex-gov-sheriff-senator-ndume-ex-envoy-as-sect-sponsors/.
38 “Maku Accuses North East Politicians of Creating Boko Haram,” Newsdairy, December 31, 2013, 
accessed November 17, 2015, http://newsdiaryonline.com/maku-accuses-north-east-politicians-
creating-boko-haram/.
39 A. Agbo, “A Game of Vultures,” Tell, January 17, 2011, 23.
40 E. Bello, and L. Sabo, “Boko Haram Crisis Wasn’t Religious,” Leadership Weekend, August 8, 
2009, 10.
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fairness.”41 At the expiration of his tenure as the
Kaga Area Council chairman, Foi was appointed the caretaker committee 
chairman of the same area council. Described as a man of impeccable honesty, 
and “one of the few voices in the wilderness crying against corruption by 
politicians selected into public offices,”42 Sheriff appointed Foi as commissioner 
for local government affairs. He was later redeployed to the Ministry of Religious 
Affairs and his house according to his neighbors was always visited by politicians 
including Governor Sheriff.43
Foi and his Boko Haram group had worked as part of the political militia 
that helped Sheriff win his election. In addition to a commissionership slot in the 
government, Sheriff was also effecting the full implementation of the Sharia as part 
of the pre-election deal with the group. Sheriff’s reluctance to effect this latter 
part of the deal obviously angered the Boko Haram sect and strained the group’s 
relationship with him. Thus, at the beginning of the Sheriff’s second term in office, 
Foi approached him with a proposal to resign his office, because according to Foi, 
it was the only way he could make paradise.44
Sheriff preemptively dissolved his cabinet to forestall Foi going to town with 
the news that he left the cabinet.45 The adoption of the Sharia in twelve northern 
states,46 and Sheriff’s failure to adopt the Islamic legal system in Borno where 
it was hoped could eliminate the inconsistencies observed in the implementation 
of the Islamic legal system in other northern states, could have inspired Foi’s call for 
Sheriff’s resignation after he walked away from Sheriff’s government. Situating 
Foi’s grouse within another context is also necessary. Besides the issue of 
corruption, as commissioner for religious affairs, Sheriff’s administration had 
banned motorcyclists’ movement in Maiduguri after 7 p.m. His administration 
also imposed a law that required motorcyclists to provide helmets for themselves 
and their passengers as a way of protecting them against head injuries in the event of 
accidents. This piece of legislation affected mostly the down-trodden and Almajiris, 
most of whom were used as political militia during elections, thereafter abandoned, 
flocking around the Islamic preachers who fed them daily with religious fantasies. 
Ustaz Foi was known for his “sense of fairness.” On the surface, the motorcyclists’ 
reluctance to obey the helmet legislation may appear a protestation of their poor 
material conditions. In reality, however at play was resistance politics against their 
41 Reef. 
42 Ibid.
43 Ibid.
44 Bello and Sabo,11.
45 Ibid.
46 Sergie and Johnson.
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abandonment in the post-polls period by the Boko Haram group whose members 
worked as political militias as it was also against Sheriff’s refusal to adopt the 
Sharia. The helmet legislation provided an ample opportunity for the Boko Haram 
leadership to mobilize its members against the government.
Governor Sheriff later relished how he set up a security outfit, “Operation 
Flush,” to deal with Yusuf and his crowd, which included Foi:
As a governor, I had to take charge and restore some measure of order 
to my domain. I started creating laws. I first started by making a law 
regulating motorcycles, because at night, you find over one thousand 
motorcycles in the city. They would move from one end of the town 
to the other with different kinds of weapons: cutlasses, swords, etc…. 
And because they don’t wear helmets, I insisted that they begin to do 
so. I asked that their members be arrested and tried.47
Foi was killed in the aftermath of the crackdown on Yusuf’s followers. Before 
his death however, the former commissioner had demanded to meet with governor 
Sheriff, a request that was reportedly turned downed by the then governor. According 
to Okereke, “there exist [sic] a school of thought that contend [sic] that the killing 
of Ustaz Mohammed Yusuf and Ustaz Buji Foi was orchestrated to deny Nigerians 
true knowledge of the major sponsors and profiteers from the incident.”48 It was not 
ascertained whether Yusuf’s father’s low-level education and a corresponding 
poor material condition influenced his resignation of his secular job, as well 
his son’s dropping out of school. But Yusuf, who had taken over from his father, 
whose Quranic school was receiving wards from people within and outside of the 
Maiduguri, became someone whose “popularity was phenomenal, making friends 
easily, and some politicians who sought the truth identified with his movement 
discreetly and assisted him tremendously.”49
Perhaps amidst his preaching which resonated anti-corruption messages and 
disappointment with the western system of governance, past administrations 
before Sheriff’s had become uncomfortable with Yusuf as his influence grew in the 
state. Attempts to restrict him to certain sections of the state prompted his father in-
law, a known arms dealer who was also quite influential, to offer Yusuf the refuge 
of his large compound in the Railways Quarters in Borno State. It was at this 
location that Yusuf built “a movement that would ultimately unleash a phenomenal 
crisis which has not been seen in the history of Borno state since the Maitatsine 
47 Bello and Sabo, 11.
48 Okereke, 456.
49 Reef.
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violence of 1983.”50 Why authorities refused to revoke Yusuf’s abode despite 
security reports of the unwholesome activities going on there, is suggestive that 
either Yusuf and his father in-law had become too powerful and untouchable by the 
authorities, or that in certain critical quarters, the movement Yusuf had built was 
of immense importance to the political actors holding the reins of government. 
Noteworthy, however, about the man who would later lead a group that declared 
Western civilization as forbidden, were some of the activities that went on in 
his large Railways Quarters abode. It was reported that, “despite claims that Boko 
Haram was against western education and its leader averse to western civilization, 
a trip to one of Yusuf’s compounds outside of the Railways Quarters shows that he 
ran a nursery school that was involved in teaching English and Maths…. Yusuf 
had computers with internet services for communication.”51
When the security forces stormed Yusuf’s abodes, they also found a Toyota 
Sienna SUV, among seven cars and many motorcycles, which belonged to sect 
members who used them for commercial operations otherwise known as okada.52 
The discovery therefore contradicts the sect’s posturing:
Available information indicates that the group emanated from
an orthodox teaching slightly resembling that of the Taliban in
Afghanistan and Pakistan. Their school of thought considers
anything western as an aberration or completely unislamic. 
The group viewed the western influence on Islamic society as
the basis of the religion’s weakness. Hence their declaration that
western education and indeed all western institution is infidel
and as such must be avoided by Muslims…. It was gathered that
most people sold their belongings to contribute to the coffers
of fighting the cause of Allah to save Islam from the clutches of
western influences and domination.53
Prior to his death, Yusuf’s abode usually gave the impression of big party 
as the whole area of the Railway Quarters would be lined with exotic cars 
owned by very powerful individuals who would arrive with tinted glasses that 
shielded them from easy identification when visiting Yusuf.54 It is also not known 
at what stage Yusuf began to use his large compound at the Railways Quarters as a 
training ground for militant activities. It is ironic that the same Yusuf, who a f t e r 
50 Ibid.
51 Ibid.
52 Ibid.
53 Onyebuchi and Chigozie, 210.
54 Ibid.
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the shooting of his members by the men of the Operation Flush boasted that “his 
group would be prepared to confront all the security agencies in the State as well 
as government,”55 was also the same man who earlier had been cast as resisting 
Islamizing Nigeria by means of violence. It is therefore safe to speculate that 
while Yusuf did not believe in using violence to propagate Islam, turning his 
abode into a training ground for militant activities as well as the weapons found 
with his followers, were all part of the instrumentality used in supporting 
Sheriff in edging out Mala Kachallah, then the Governor of the Bornu State 
Government House, with the understanding that Sheriff would introduce Sharia 
in the state. Sheriff’s failure to implement that pre-electoral understanding thus set 
his administration on a collision path with the sect. When Nigerian soldiers stormed 
their Bama camp in Borno in 2013, they found items such as used condoms which 
contrasted a Moslem preaching of a return to the Islam’s glorious days of great 
piety56 – thus exposing the contradiction between what the sect preached and 
what they practiced.
Undoubtedly, this questions their pious religious posturing. Each socio-
economic and political environment has its peculiar character that can easily be 
exploited by criminal elements. In the Southern part of Nigeria, a predominantly 
Christian area, religion is treated as a distinct sphere of life, and separated from 
socio-economic and political issues. Hence in the old Eastern states, abandoned 
disgruntled political militia men drift into militancy, oil pipeline vandalism, 
and kidnapping to make a living. In the South-West, street extortion and money 
hustling, otherwise known as Area Boyism hold sway.
However in the predominantly Moslem North, where the Boko Haram violence 
occurs, criminal elements exploit the tradition of the Islamic religion ordering of 
social relations among people, including legal, contractual institutions, social 
and political institutions, and issues of economic propriety and practice57 to blame 
western values for the mismanagement of the country’s resources. In addition, the 
lack of Western education and high unemployment rate in the Northern region offer 
such group “a seemingly bottomless reservoir from which to draw disgruntled 
youth recruits.”58 With the thin line between Islamic religion and other spheres 
of life, extremist groups like Boko Haram that appear fed up with failed promises 
of politicians, would easily resort to seeking spiritual solutions to what is viewed as 
55 Ibid.
56 M. Mozayyan, “Glory in Defeat and Other Islamist Ideologies,” in Pirates, Terrorists, and Warlords: 
The History, Influence, and Future of Armed Groups Around the World, ed. H.J. Norwitz (New York: 
Skyhorse Publishing, 2009).
57 Hoogvelt, 200.
58 Onyebuchi and Chigozie, 212.
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an insoluble problem.59 Furthermore, coupled with some segments of the Northern 
Muslim population, allegedly unhappy with the compromise of state-level Sharia 
co-existing side by side with a secular system, these groups increasingly become 
radicalized and are more willing to periodically express themselves through 
violence. Within these groups also are elements who share the view that Western 
education is incapable of stimulating any meaningful development and prosperity 
in the region; hence their quest for the imposition of the Sharia on the country. 60
Understanding the Boko Haram Violence
In the synopsis to an essay on the security challenge posed by the Boko Haram 
violence, I have postulated that analyses that consider the political context of 
the insurgency deserve particular attention, especially in relation to President 
Jonathan’s contestation of the 2011 presidential election and the recently 
concluded 2015 elections.61 Similarly, in another work, which focused on the 
tendency by Nigerian ethnic groups to employ violence in the struggle to capture 
central power, I stressed how forced co-habitation of the disparate pre-Nigerian 
groups in a single political economy by British imperialism engendered a socio-
political environment which predisposes these social forces to intense struggle for 
power whose utility value is its guarantee of unfettered access to the public till. 
The utility of violence in the struggle for political ascendency, was “evident in 
the Hausa-Fulani hegemony of the 1960s through the late 1990s via the control of 
the country’s military, the Yoruba presidency from 1999-2007 via the violence 
that trailed the annulled June 12 1993 presidential election and the Ijaw presidency 
via the Niger Delta militancy.”62
Jean Herskovits has rightly argued that while the original core of the group 
remains active, Boko Haram has become a franchise for many criminal gangs who 
have adopted the name to claim responsibility for attacks when it suits them.63 
Although the Boko Haram sect had formed prior to the emergence of the Jonathan 
administration, the intensity which its violence assumed in the post-2011 general 
elections period, led to the inevitable conclusion that the insurgency is not only 
about fulfilling the pre-election threat by some Northerners of making the country 
59 Lengmang, 101.
60 Ibid.
61 Alozieuwa, “Contending Theories.”
62 Simeon Alozieuwa, “Violence as a Bargaining Tool for Political Ascendency in a Multi- ethnic 
Society: The Nigeria Experience,” in Internal Security Management in Nigeria: A Study in Terrorism 
and Counter-Terrorism eds. Ozoemenam Mbachu and Usman Bature (Kaduna: Medusa Academic 
Publishers Limited, 2013), 182.
63 Jean Herskovits, “In Nigeria, Boko Haram Is Not the Problem,” New York Times, January 2, 2012, 
accessed November 17, 2015, http://nytimes.com/2012/01/02/opinion/in-nigeria-boko-haram-is-not-
the-problem.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.
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ungovernable should Jonathan contest and win the election, but also geared towards 
the North’s quest to reclaim power by 2015. In the period leading up to that 
election, some political forces from the North bitterly challenged Jonathan’s moral 
authority to vie for the country’s presidency on the premise that the North was yet 
to do an eight-year term in the context of North-South zoning and power rotation 
principles said to have been instituted by the then ruling People’s Democratic 
Party (PDP).
Amidst the rancor surrounding his ascension to power in 2010 following 
his predecessor Umaru Musa Yar’Adua’s death, as well as the opposition that 
mounted against his vying for the 2011 presidential polls, Jonathan had come up 
with an appeasement gesture towards the North- West region of Nigeria from 
where Yar’Adua hailed, namely, the choice of Namadi Sambo, the governor of 
North-West state of Kaduna, first as his deputy, and second as his running mate 
in the 2011 elections. Ishiaka Mohammed Bawa, the Chief Whip of the House 
of Representatives of the Nigerian National Assembly and leader of the North-
East caucus in the House made a statement very significant in this analysis. 
According to him, “We felt that over the years, the North-Eastern region has 
been marginalized in all aspects of life in this country, [and] marginalization is 
responsible for insecurity in North-East.”64 Thus, “in the general context of 
Northern angst over the loss of central power, Boko Haram may be conceived of 
as a resurgent Northern ethnic militia or in the specific context of the Kanuri sense 
of marginalization, an emergent militia for that ethnic group.”65
In attempting to establish a causality between the current season of 
violence in Nigeria and intense contestation for federal power that marked 
Jonathan/Ijaw ascendency since 2010, Nigeria’s Nobel Laureate, Wole Soyinka, 
had played down the perspective that links the mayhem to economic factors such 
as unemployment, mismanagement, misplaced priorities, social marginalization, 
and massive corruption. According to him, “to limit oneself to these factors alone, 
is an evasion, intellectual and moral cowardice, and a fear of offending the ruthless 
caucuses that have unleashed terror on society, a refusal to stare the irrational in 
the face and give it its proper name – and response.”66
Former Nigeria’s foreign affairs minister, Bolaji Akinyemi, conceptualizes 
the Nigerian army from July 1966 to May 1999 as an Hausa- Fulani ethnic militia in 
64 Ahmed Mohammed, “Nigeria: North-East Suffers Marginalization,” Sunday Trust, February 12, 
2012.
65 Alozieuwa, “Contending Theories.”
66 Wole Soyinka, “Wole Soyinka on Nigeria’s Anti-Christian Terror Sect Boko Haram.” Newsweek, 
January 16, 2012, accessed November 17, 2015, http://www.newsweek.com/wole-soyinka-nigerias-
anti- christian-terror-sect-boko-haram-64153.
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the unclassical sense of the term (ethnic militia) in that although the Nigerian army 
is composed of representatives of many of the nationalities of Nigeria, it was only 
the Northern Hausa-Fulani military representatives who had a sense of collective 
interests to advance and protect. Hence, the first intervention by a formal ethnic 
militia in Nigeria’s politics was in July 1966 when the counter-coup took place 
and the series of coups since July 1966 were designed by the North to protect 
the North.67 Following the end of the ideological Cold War between the West and 
East, military rule generally became an aberration globally. For Nigeria, perhaps 
the most important effect of that development was that the Nigerian army could 
no longer be appropriated as an ethnic militia by any ethnic group to topple an 
elected government - a tendency that had existed among the Hausa-Fulani ethnic 
group for most the country’s political history until 1999. Indeed very significantly, 
in 1999, retired army captain and former military intelligence operative, Sagir 
Mohammed, had formed a northern militia, the Arewa People’s Congress (APC) 
to “protect and safeguard the interest of the North wherever it is.”68 And outside 
of the North, the APC is perceived by some as founded for “the maintenance 
of [Northern] hegemonic control in national politics.”69 More so, “unlike the 
other ethnic militias who seek change, the Arewa People’s Congress seeks the 
maintenance of the status quo, irrespective of its crises of marginalization.”70
Bingham Powell Jr. conceives of democracy as a strategy of government 
based on the gamble that the potential for participation and responsiveness that it 
offers will make possible a resolution of conflict without violence. Where large-
scale violence or coercion does however appear, he contends, democracy is 
fundamentally threatened. Not only does the influence of coercion on decision-
making weaken the importance of democratic resources, but failure of government 
to maintain order and security leads citizens to look more positively on authoritarian 
alternatives.71
Furthermore, from a strategic point of view, organized political violence has 
three very general objectives: to change the bargaining rules of the democratic 
game, to undermine the support enjoyed by the regime or its major parties, or to 
67 Ajibola B. Akinyemi, “Ethnic Militia and the National Question in Nigeria,” in Urban Violence, 
Ethnic Militia and the Challenge of Democratic Consolidation in Nigeria, ed. Tunde Babatunde 
(Lagos: Malthouse Press Limited, 2003), 21.
68 Kalu N. Obasi, Ethnic Militias, Vigilantes and Separatist Groups in Nigeria (Abuja: Third 
Millennium Ltd, 2002), 43.
69 Ibid.
70 Akinyemi.
71 Bingham Powell Jr. Contemporary Democracies: Participation, Stability and Violence (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1982), 154.
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intimidate the opposition while mobilizing.72 “And the association between rioting 
and deaths by violence was notably higher in ethnically fractionalized countries.”73
There is a direct correlation among the following variables: the rejection of 
military intervention in politics, the North’s marginal occupation of the Nigerian 
presidency since the commencement of democratic governance in the country in 
1999, the emergence and transformation of the Boko Haram as an ethnic militia 
in the context of an appropriated machinery, and the current virulent violence 
in Nigeria, which has resulted in thousands of deaths. The huge resources 
committed to the counter-insurgency war in Nigeria could have been deployed to 
tackling many of Nigeria’s infrastructure problems. And sustained violence and 
deaths have forced the Nigerian citizenry to begin to question whether the civilian 
(democratic) framework is capable of being secure. The Boko Haram violence in 
Nigeria obviously poses a real threat to the country’s young democracy. In 
the context of an ethnically fractionalized country, the marginal occupation of 
the Nigeria’s presidency by the Northern power elite since 1999 also resonates 
with the logic of “highly placed, highly disgruntled, and thus highly motivated 
individuals who, having lost out in the power stakes are determined to bring society 
to its knees and under a specific fundamentalist strain.”74 Equally, the rise of the 
counter-terrorism outfit, the Civilian “Joint Task Force” (JTF), made up of the 
Borno youths in Maiduguri, the Borno state capital and the hotbed of the Boko 
Harm insurgency, evinces the conclusion that deadly violence is not, systematically 
and crossnationally, a product of patterns of citizen involvement and support, but 
of the strategic efforts of small groups of political elites. The Northern commoner 
who continually grapples with the factors of basic needs such as food, shelter, 
and housing is more concerned with the dilapidating effect of the insurgency on 
his daily life than the elite who worry about political power. This elite responds 
rather directly to the strains and limitations of ethnicity and lower modernization, 
to checks of constitutional structure, and to the policies of political opponents.75 
Are there, therefore, forces sworn to bringing back the military as Soyinka has 
postulated? The crux of the problem, indeed, perhaps, as Africa’s foremost political 
economist, the late Claude Ake, rightly noted, is the over-politicization of social life: 
“[W]e are intoxicated with politics: the premium on political power is so high that 
we are prone to take the most extreme measures to win and to maintain political 
72 Ibid, 158.
73 Ibid, 157
74 Soyinka, “Wole Soyinka on Nigeria’s Anti-Christian Terror Sect Boko Haram,” Newsweek, January 
16, 2012.
75 Powell Jr.
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power.”76 The late former National Security Adviser, General Patrick Oweye Azazi, 
had declared that the Boko Haram violence was all about wrangling over power 
rotation. Azizi died shortly afterwards in a crash in a military helicopter. In his 
response to a private letter made public by former President Olusegun Obasanjo, 
President Goodluck Jonathan was also of the view that,
At the heart of all the current troubles in our party and the larger
polity is the unbridled jostling and positioning for personal or group 
advantage ahead of the 2015 general elections. The “bitterness, anger, 
mistrust, fear and deep suspicion” you wrote
about all flow from this singular factor.77
Reference needs to be made to the attempts to explain the violence within 
the social/human needs theoretical framework, which going by the foregoing 
analysis has already encountered formidable difficulties. Indeed the then ruling 
People’s Democratic Party, PDP, had dismissed Boko Haram as a not a product 
of poverty or misrule, but a local terror group.78 Apart from among other 
prominent northerners like the former Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) governor79 
and the governor of Niger state, Aliyu Babangida,80 who link the Boko Haram 
violence to poverty, strong voices in the North have also faulted the social/human 
needs perspective. Former senate president, David Mark, argues that poverty and 
unemployment no longer offer a cogent explanation for the insurgency as these 
adverse socio-economic conditions are not exclusive to the North.81 The Catholic 
Bishop of Sokoto Dioceses, Mathew Hassan Kukah, also adds quite an illuminating 
angle to the debate. According to the cleric,
the Bureau of Statistics had released a report that Sokoto State
was the poorest state in Nigeria. I wasn’t prepared to join the
debate, but if Sokoto is the poorest state in Nigeria and if Boko
76 Alozieuwa, “Contending Theories.”
77 “Read Jonathan’s letter to Obasanjo,” Vanguard, December 22, 2013, accessed November 17, 2015, 
http://www. vanguardngr.com/2013/12/jonathans-letter-obasanjo/.
78 Ameh Comrade Godwin, “Poverty, misrule not reason for Boko Haram insurgency – PDP,” 
DailyPost, January 26, 2013, accessed November 17, 2015, http://dailypost.ng/2013/01/26/poverty-
misrule- not-reason-for-boko-haram-insurgency-pdp/.
79 “Sanusi Links Boko Haram to Derivation,” This Day, January 28, 2012, accessed November 17, 
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Haram is driven by poverty, shouldn’t we (Sokoto) be the most
violent state in Nigeria? How is it that we are still the most
peaceful? What this does is that it explodes the myth and perhaps
we might have founded our analysis on a wrong premise. I don’t
think you can scientifically correlate violence with poverty.82
Indeed hordes of beggars who line Katsina streets reflect the poverty in that 
North-Western state, yet it has neither bred nor harbored such a violent group.83 
Despite the broadening of its contacts with other Islamist groups such as al-
Qaeda in the Maghreb (AQIM), which warranted the designation with its splinter 
group, Ansaru, as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) by the United States, the 
perspective which views the political militia strain of the Boko Haram sect as 
espousing a strong local concern intricately woven around the country’s politics 
resonates very strongly. Serious consideration needs also be accorded to the 
impracticability of imposing the Sharia on a heterogeneously complex political 
community such as Nigeria. The core of the Boko Haram committed to Islamizing 
Nigeria remains a fringe group, which not only antagonizes mainstream Northern 
Muslims, but also are yet to evolve a broad coalition that will include mainstream 
Northern Muslims and their elite corps. The author has argued elsewhere that 
whereas the Mujahedeen are focused on Islam’s days of glory or great piety, 
which to them assures the true believer of spiritual salvation and an eternally 
joyful existence in the world beyond, the average Nigerian Muslim political elite 
is most likely uninterested in the core Boko Haram’s version of Islam, and may, 
in the words of M. Mozayyan, be more interested in a future that guarantees 
independent thought, social liberty, modernity, and economic remuneration in a 
world– progressive Islam.84
The transformation of the violence from a Bornu affair to a national affair 
fits into the characterization of the group as “a local terror group” by the PDP. Thus 
between June and August, 2011 when it struck at the police headquarters and the 
United Nations building both in Abuja, Nigeria’s capital and arguably safest city, 
the Boko Haram sect had transformed from a violent group whose campaign was 
initially restricted to the North East part of the country to a more formidable force. 
It had graduated from a hitherto presumably bunch of rag-tag inconsequential 
miscreants that could be summarily dealt with to a virulent violent organization 
capable of issuing and making good its threat.
82 Bolaji Ogundele, “Boko Haram Menace Beyond Poverty – Rev. Kukah,” May 8, 2013, accessed 
November 17, 2015, http://universalreporters247.com/2013/05/boko-haram-menace-beyond-
poverty-rev- kukah/.
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The attack on the police headquarters was not only a cynical response to the 
boast by then inspector-general of police, Hafiz Ringim, that he would crush the 
group in the aftermath of its attempted attack of the headquarters in Maiduguri, 
the capital of the North East state of Borno, it was also for “the humiliating 
treatment meted out to our members by security agencies in various parts of the 
country.”85 The United Nations building bombing clearly, therefore, supports the 
PDP position that “some people are out to perpetrate acts of terrorism in Nigeria to 
create a semblance of insecurity.”86
In an interview titled, “Boko Haram Menace Beyond Poverty,” Kukah 
raised a very pertinent question:
Can we explain why this Boko Haram is dominant in Maiduguri, Yobe 
and not in Sokoto or Kebbi? … If this was about religion, and Muslims 
are trying to expand the frontiers of Islam, which kind of a stupid 
man will be fighting inside his own house and hope to conquer other 
people?87
At the immediate domestic level, it is obvious the group is at war with 
those that armed and used them to defeat opponents in the political struggle and 
later abandoned them, and which explains the initial killing of politicians in Borno 
and Bauchi. While that local score might not have been settled, as the violence 
attracted national response from the federal center, some highly placed and highly 
disgruntled persons who lost out in the power stake began to appropriate the 
group for violence in the struggle for central power. This explains why while the 
sect makes attempts to penetrate Abuja, its campaign in the North-East persists. 
The factionalization of the group soon after Yusuf’s death, apart from providing 
explanation for the group’s current level of radicalization, also could prove that 
while the original group represented by the murdered Yusuf’s father in-law, Fugu, 
remained the core commitment to the sect’s initial ideals, the faction which actually 
killed him was the political armed gang determined to protest Jonathan’s vying of 
the 2011 presidential polls and importantly, his contesting the presidency again in 
2015.
The violence however appears to pay off. While central power might have 
moved out of the North, the Nigerian state under the Jonathan presidency continued 
to make huge concessions to that part of Nigeria which perhaps would not have 
been the case but for the insurgency; while the North-East in the meantime may 
85 Ibrahim Mshelizza, “Islamist sect Boko Haram claims Nigerian U.N. bombing,” Reuters, August 
28, 2011, accessed November 17, 2015, http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/08/29/us-nigeria-
bombing-claim-idUSTRE77S3ZO20110829.
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not have yet occupied central power as the North-West, North-Central, South-
West and now South-South, certain socio-economic and political measures have 
been taken to address its crisis of marginalization than had previously been the 
case. On the socio-economic sphere, the government created a N100 billion Green 
Belt de-desertification project for some frontline states in the North. No such 
special initiative has been designed specifically for the South-East, which is being 
ravaged by gully erosion but has not taken up arms against the state despite its 
obvious marginalization from the country’s topmost political office. There is also 
the Almajiri education program initiated by the federal government for the entire 
northern region. For the North-East region specifically, a N2 billion special 
intervention program was ear-marked in the 2014 annual budget for the states of 
Borno, Yobe, and Adamawa, which have been devastated by insurgency and were 
placed under a state of emergency at some points in time.
In the political sphere, as the military crackdown on the insurgents persists, 
unlike the previous state of emergencies in the country, which were in 1964 and 
2003, civil political structures remained in the areas where it had been declared. 
The chairmanship of the ruling PDP appears to have been conceded to persons 
from the area as a way of giving the region a sense of inclusiveness.
Conclusion
This paper focused on the Boko Haram crisis in Nigeria beyond the general theme 
of the current global Islamic violence. While acknowledging Islamist violence as a 
factor, it however places much premium on the local contexts of the violence and 
argues that the local political issues, more than any other considerations, offer more 
cogent explanation of the problem. The paper notes the religious origin of the sect, 
which later transformed into a militia group for politicians, a tendency that dates 
back to pre- independent Nigeria. From a local Borno affair, the group became a 
ready tool appropriated by some elements of national politicians struggling for the 
control of central power. These elements were specifically dissatisfied with the 
return of central power to the South following the death of Umaru Musa Yar’Adua, 
which denied the North the opportunity to be in power for many years. Jonathan’s 
initially speculated interest in contesting the 2015 presidential elections rallied 
these forces together and pitted them against his government. Although initially 
the violence was perceived as a general Northern protestation of its loss of central 
power, it however later became clearly a North-East tool for bargaining for political 
ascendency. However, while the concern with the local political issues within the 
North-East area persists, increasing state clamp down on the sect eventually drove 
it into seeking alliance with international terror networks.
The Nigerian state has adopted some counter-terrorist measures to stem 
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the violence. Apart from the military option, some socio-economic measures 
have also been adopted. However, no visible political concessions have been made, 
especially at the national level where the political disagreement actually raised the 
scepter of the violence. There is, therefore, the need for a national consensus for a 
viable power-sharing arrangement among Nigeria’s diverse ethnic groups in order 
to give each component
a sense of belonging in the country’s power equation. The arrangement 
should come in the form of a constitutional legislation that provides for the 
rotation of power among the component parts in a pre-agreed formula.
Indeed, democracy as a government of the people for the people and by 
the people should be adapted within the reality of Nigeria’s multi- ethnicity to 
ensure that no group is made to feel left out of the country’s political power. 
Perspectives which suggest that it matters less where the political leadership 
at the national, state, or local government levels emanate from tend to ignore 
the reality that although no particular ethnic group in Nigeria can claim exclusive 
monopolization of pillaging the commonwealth at any point in time, politics in 
Africa still remains privatized by the continent’s leaders. Indeed, according former 
Senegalese leader, Leopold Senghor, politics in Africa is not the art of governing 
the state for the public welfare in the general framework of laws and regulations, but 
that of the politician’s politics, the struggle of clans, the tendencies to place well 
one’s self, one’s relations and one’s clients in the cursus honorum; that is the race 
for preferments.88 Ensuring, therefore, that every part of the country shall occupy 
the highest political position in the country in a pre- determined and predictable 
arrangement will bring stability and peace to Nigeria. President Jonathan for 
instance hails from a small community in Bayelsa, if not the smallest state in 
Nigeria. He is of Ijaw ethnic group, a minority ethnic group in Nigeria. His 
ascendency, therefore, proves that every part of the country has a “best” candidate 
that can be presented for Nigeria’s leadership.
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